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The Persistence of Book-Tax Differences 
 
Abstract:  
 
Academic researchers and policy activists have used the difference between 
accounting income and estimated taxable income, commonly referred to as the 
book-tax difference (BTD) as a proxy of the unobservable level of corporate income 
tax planning. In drawing any policy implications from observed BTDs, an 
understanding of the sources of BTDs and their properties is important. In 
particular, identifying the degree of persistence or representativeness of an 
observed annual BTD is critical. 
To the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to examine how BTDs and 
their components e.g. permanent differences, temporary differences and the effect 
of differences between UK and overseas statutory tax rate behave over time. The 
necessary data disclosed under IAS 12 Income Taxes (IASB, 2010) has only been 
systematically publicly disclosed in the UK since 2005.  
In summary, the results indicate that the degree of persistence is dependent 
on the nature of the BTD and that this variation in persistence itself varies by 
industry group. The most persistence component relates to differences between UK 
and overseas statutory tax rates with temporary differences being the least 
persistent, indicative of a non-earnings management motivation. Within industry 
groupings there is wide variation in the level of persistence. While 59.4% of the 
sample companies experienced only one change of sign BTD at most in the six year 
period, the balance of the sample had at least two changes. 
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The Persistence of Book-Tax Differences 
 
1. Introduction 
A recent phenomenon is the increased scrutiny of the level of corporate 
income tax paid by companies (Whiting, 2006). Companies have often attracted 
adverse attention because of a perceived discrepancy between the level of 
accounting profits reported and the associated levels of taxable income and 
consequentially, the level of corporate income tax payable e.g. UK Uncut (2010) and 
Public Accounts Committee (2012). In general terms the scrutiny reflects concerns 
over companies’ use of tax avoidance techniques and the perceived consequences 
on levels of government revenues and increased levels of taxation on other 
taxpayer groups (The Guardian, 2009; Trade Union Congress, 2009; UK Uncut, 
2010; New Statesman, 2011 and Christian Aid, 2012). Hasseldine, Holland & Van 
der Rijt (2012) show that tax administrations have responded in a number of ways. 
These include the publication of UK Tax Gap statistics by HMRC in 2009 for the first 
time and the introduction into UK legislation of a General Anti Avoidance Rule – 
GAAR (HMRC 2013). Further afield intergovernmental organisations have published 
proposals to “combat” tax avoidance e.g. EU (2013) and OECD (2013).  
Companies are required to calculate two measures of income on an annual 
basis. One measure is determined by financial reporting regulations to give 
accounting or book income while the second uses tax law to produce a figure of 
taxable income. The degree to which the resulting levels of income correspond 
depends on the extent of conformity between the two measures (Hanlon, 2005). 
Any difference between the two levels is commonly referred to as the book-tax 
difference (BTD). Emphasising the importance of BTDs, “large” US corporations have 
been required to file with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) a reconciliation 
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(Schedule M-3) of taxable income and financial accounting income since 2004 
(Boynton & Mills, 2004).  
In response to BTDs, there have been calls to require conformity between the 
two income measures to end “arbitraging” between the two measures i.e. reporting 
accounting income that is not included in taxable income and to increase the 
reliability of reported accounting income by removing the greater flexibility 
available under financial reporting standards compared with tax legislation (Desai, 
2005). However, advocates of the current position argue such conformity would 
lead to a loss of information content by removing this flexibility through which 
managers can signal private information (Hanlon, Maydew & Shevlin, 2008). These 
studies examine the persistence of accounting income i.e. the relation between 
accounting earnings in successive periods.  
We examine a different question by focusing for the first time on the 
persistence of annual BTDs. While BTDs as can arise for a number of reasons 
including tax planning, a passive interaction between accounting and tax based 
income definitions and earnings management (Graham, Raedy & Shackelford, 2012), 
we use IAS 12 Income Taxes (IASB 2010) to examine aggregate and disaggregated 
BTDS.1 This allows separate consideration of permanent and temporary differences 
in the income measures, and the effect on of income being taxable in overseas 
jurisdictions with statutory tax rates that differ from the UK rate. Using 
disaggregated measures allows a better understanding of the underlying 
motivation. The sample comprises a panel of UK quoted non-financial companies 
over the six year period 2005 – 2010 and comprises 798 company-year 
observations. 
The paper contributes to the literature on corporate tax performance by 
analysing the dynamic processes which give rise to BTDs in three aspects. Firstly, 
whether the sign of BTDs i.e. whether accounting income is higher or lower than 
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estimated taxable income, changes over time or is consistent, affects the validity of 
using a single (annual) observation as a representative measure of corporate income 
tax behaviour and the conclusions that can be drawn. This has direct implications 
when analysing corporate performance in terms of after tax income performance 
and more widely in terms of judging corporate behaviour with respect to broader 
societal expectations. Secondly, it provides an insight into corporate behaviour. A 
positive (negative) serial correlation in BTDs infers companies consistently 
(temporarily) maintaining the relative levels of accounting and taxable income. 
Thirdly, to the extent these dynamics vary by company is an indicator of company 
specific tax behaviour and provides a measure of the extent to which companies 
deviate from their peers. This can have implications for the effectiveness of 
regulatory policy with respect to both taxation and accounting.  
In summary, the results indicate that the degree of persistence is dependent 
on the nature of the BTD and that this variation in persistence itself varies by 
industry group. The most persistence component relates to differences between UK 
and overseas statutory tax rates with temporary differences being the least 
persistent indicative of a non-earnings management motivation. Within industry 
groupings there is wide variation in the level of persistence. While 59.4% of the 
sample companies experienced only one change of sign BTD at most in the six year 
period, the balance had at least two changes. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a review of relevant 
literature and is followed by Section 3 on sample and data, Section 4 explains the 
research design while Section 5 presents the results of the analysis and Section 6 
contains a discussion and the paper’s conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review 
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The concept of persistence is familiar in research examining the quality of 
accounting earnings where higher (lower) temporal correlation in accounting 
earnings is interpreted as indicative of higher (lower) quality of earnings (Sloan 
1996). This approach has also been used to examine the relative information 
content of accounting earnings and cash flow by decomposing accounting earnings 
into cashflows from operations and accounting accruals. Sloan (1996) found a 
higher persistence between cashflows and next period accounting earnings than 
with accounting accruals and next period accounting earnings. This lower quality in 
accounting accruals is attributed to the flexibility and subjectivity involved in their 
calculation which allows a greater independence between successive values.  
Hanlon (2005) and Blaylock, Shevlin & Wilson (2012) examined the 
information content of BTDs by the extent to which they moderate the relation 
between current period accruals and next period accounting earnings. BTDs as a 
summary measure of the comparison between two income measurement systems 
can provide additional information on earnings persistence beyond that in the 
accounting earnings figure (Hanlon, 2005). Taxable income may be a more robust 
measure less liable to management and therefore BTDs may be indicative of the 
extent of earnings management (Desai, 2005, Abdul Wahab &,Holland, 2012). 
Hanlon (2005) finds that the relation between accounting accruals and next period 
accounting earnings is moderated by the level of BTDs with higher BTDs being 
associated with lower earnings persistence. Raedy, Seidman and Shackelford (2011) 
use disaggregated BTDs to extend Hanlon (2005) and conclude that investors price 
all components of the BTD equally irrespective of their differing nature; a result they 
described as “baffling” given the differing cashflows effects of the various sources 
of BTDs. 
 
XXX Insert figure 1 about here XXX 
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In viewing this paper it is useful to consider the processes involved in 
generating accounting earnings and taxable income measures, this is shown in 
figure 1. The earnings persistence literature reviewed above concentrates on the 
information content of current accounting earnings or decomposed accounting 
earnings in forecasting future accounting earnings. Instead we focus on the 
persistency of BTDs in their own right.  
Although there is limited research on BTDs we are not aware of any which 
examines their persistence. While Plesko & Weber (2009) examine the time series 
properties of accounting income and taxable income they do not examine BTDs. 
Their focus is on the use of accounting data to forecast taxable income in order to 
estimate marginal corporate income tax rates. Their finding that book and taxable 
income have similar persistence coefficients is conducive to using accounting 
income in forecasting future taxable income. Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew (2008) 
examine long term tax avoidance and find a weak relation between annual and long 
term (five and ten years) cash Effective Tax Rates (ETRs) and highlight the 
significant year to year variation in annual ETRS.2,3  This variability is reflected in the 
majority of companies (>73%) not being able to maintain a consistently low ETR at 
below 20% compared to a mean rate of 30%. Although Chen, Dhaliwal & Trombley 
(2012) use the concept of consistency in connection with BTDs to extend Hanlon 
(2005), their focus is on its moderating effect on the relation between accruals and 
future accounting earnings rather the properties of consistency. 
From a tax planning perspective, BTDs can be decomposed into permanent 
differences (PDs) and temporary differences (TDs) between accounting and taxable 
income definitions (Dyreng et al., 2008; Donohoe & McGill, 2011; Tang & Firth, 
2011). PDs arise in a single year because of differences between the two income 
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measures in how a transaction is treated (Wilson, 2009). The level of PDs can reflect 
strategic tax management (Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009). 
The second source of tax planning related BTDs arises because of temporal 
differences between accounting and taxable income measures resulting in a 
transaction being included in both accounting and taxable income measures though 
not simultaneously e.g. relief for qualifying expenditure on plant and machinery, 
and utilisation of loses (Altshuler, Auerbach, Cooper & Knittel, 2009; Shackelford, 
Slemrod & Sallee, 2011). Although the ultimate effect of TDs on a period’s 
accounting reported tax expense is almost absent, they affect the tax expense 
composition (Maydew & Shackelford, 2007) and have a cash flow timing affect. 
While TDs can represent tax avoidance in the form of tax deferral, Frank et al. 
(2009) caution that TDs can also arise from non-discretionary differences e.g. 
differences between non tax deductible accounting deprecation and tax deductible 
capital allowances. There is second dimension to the persistence of TDs. Although 
by definition TDs only produce a temporary BTD, if a company can generate net new 
TDs consistently over time through continual tax planning the effect is more 
permanent.      
BTDs can also arise from earnings management. This is more likely to 
represent PDs which can imply managerial aggressiveness in financial accounting 
reporting (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009). However, companies may be willing to pay 
corporate income tax on managed earnings as a signal of their credibility (Erickson, 
Hanlon & Maydew, 2004) and therefore include the managed earnings in both 
accounting and taxable income measures. Earnings management in the form of 
accelerating income recognition or deferring expense recognition would not change 
the composition of the overall tax change even in the unlikely event of a company 
adjusting (reversing) the effects of accounting earnings management when 
estimating corporate income tax liability.4  
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A third aspect of tax planning can be identified in the context of IAS 12 
Income Tax mandated disclosures and BTDs. Taxable income subject to a statutory 
tax rate (STR) which differs from the rate prevailing in a company’s home 
jurisdiction will give rise to a higher or lower current tax expense than would be the 
case if the income was only taxable at the domestic STR (Bucovetsky & Haufler, 
2008; Devereux, Lockwood & Redoano, 2008). We use the term Statutory Tax Rate 
Difference (STRD) to describe the net overall effect of differences in statutory tax 
rates and tax base definitions between the UK and other tax jurisdictions in which a 
firm operates. This measure can provide forward-looking information to 
shareholders in assessing the consistency of companies’ tax management activities 
(Schmidt, 2006). We also include STRD in our examination of the persistence of 
BTDs, PDs and TDs. 
The ability to generate BTDs  or the circumstances that generate them may 
be firm specific e.g. senior managements’ preferences (Dyreng, Hanlon and 
Maydew, 2010), or industry specific level. The influence of distinctive industry 
effects on companies’ tax charges has been long researched, for example, 
Harberger (1959) and Grieson, Hamovitch, Levenson & Morgenstern (1977). 
Industry membership can be relevant because of industry specific tax treatments in 
credit, incentives and allowance (Omer, Molloy & Ziebart, 1993; Holland, 1998; Kim 
& Limpaphayom, 1998; McIntyre & Nguyen, 2000). Further differences in industry 
conditions, for example, risk, competitiveness and asset structure, can explain 
variations in companies’ capital and operating expenditure with consequential 
variations tax liability (Bradley, Jarrell & Kim, 1984; Kovenock & Phillips, 1997).  
In summary, BTDs and their components PDs, TDs and STRDs have potential 
information content to interested parties. An understanding of the stability and 
persistency of these items can help shareholders, tax administrations and society 
more generally, understand the processes underlying companies’ tax performance.  
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3. Sample and data 
This paper analyses financial reporting disclosed tax data of a sample of 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange for the six year period 2005 to 
2010. The sample is restricted to non-financial companies to reduce complexities 
from variations in financial reporting regulations. Further, companies with extreme 
effective tax rates (ETRs), i.e. ETRs value outside the range ± 1 were excluded to 
control for the potential bias of nonrecurring statutory reconciliation items.5 Such 
items could be due to effects of unusual activity, for example, business dispositions 
and asset impairments (Phillips, 2003). Table 1 presents the summary of the sample 
reconciliation.  
XXX Insert Table 1 about here XXX 
 
As the effective tax rate reconciliation notes in the companies’ financial 
statements are not in machine readable form, the required tax data was hand 
gathered from the tax footnotes of each firm. IAS 12 Income Tax requires the 
disclosure of a company’s total corporate income Tax Expense (TE), separately 
identifying the current tax expense (CTE) and deferred tax expense (DTE). Further, 
a reconciliation between TE and the notional tax charge, i.e. the corporate income 
tax liability that would be expected by applying the current (UK) statutory tax rate 
to the current accounting profit is required.6 Specifically the reconciliation 
summaries the effect of, permanent differences (PD) between accounting and 
taxable income measures, differences between UK and foreign statutory tax rates 
(STRD) and disclosures the UK Statutory Tax Rate applying during the period.7 
Further, disclosure of (i) “the amount of deferred tax expense (income) relating to 
changes in tax rates or the imposition of new taxes”; and (ii) “the amount of the 
benefit arising from a previously unrecognised tax loss, tax credit or temporary 
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difference of a prior period that is used to reduce current tax expense [or deferred 
tax expense]” (IAS 12 para 80, IASB, 2010) enables the effects of such amounts, 
along with any prior year adjustments, to be removed from the TE to ensure it is 
free of distorting effects relating to other periods.8 In turn the separate disclosure 
of DTE allows the effect of temporary differences (TD) between accounting and 
taxable income measures to be quantified. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of the companies across industry 
classification (n=798). In the sample, there are more companies in the industrial 
sector (39.85%), than in consumer services (22.56%) and basic materials (9.77%). 
The relative distribution of the remaining industries is as follows: consumer goods, 
technology, oil and gas, health care and utilities.  
 
XXX Insert Table 2 about here XXX 
4. Research design 
Identification of BTD and components 
We use companies’ annual accrued corporate income tax charges to estimate 
BTDs.  This involves taking the disclosed pre-tax accounting earnings and 
estimating taxable income. Hanlon (2003) and Donohoe, McGill and Outslay (2012) 
summarise limitations in using US accounting date to estimate taxable income. 
Three major potential sources of error exist: (1) transactions that do not generate 
permanent or temporary book-tax differences, (2) research and development tax 
credits, and (3) tax rate differentials between domestic and foreign operations. The 
first condition holds in a UK/IFRS setting in that conforming differences i.e. items 
that do not appear in either accounting or taxable income, will escape 
measurement. However, the incentive for companies to enter into permanent 
confirming differences is likely to be low for quoted companies facing market 
expectations for increased reported accounting income (Erickson et al. 2004, 
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Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). The information in the IAS 12 tax reconciliation allows 
the second limitation to be overcome and the third reduced as discussed below. 
However, the overall conclusion remains that as in all jurisdictions where public 
access to companies’ tax returns is not routinely available, estimates of taxable 
income using only publically available information will measure underlying taxable 
income with error. However, in this setting the source of the error can be identified. 
We calculate a company’s book tax differences (BTDs) as follows by firstly  
defining BTDs as: 
 
TPPBTBTD       (1) 
 
where: PBT = profit before tax and TP = estimated taxable profits. To arrive at TP in 
the absence of access to a company’s confidential tax returns, we effectively gross 
up the CTE. We define CTE as:  
)*()*( ososukuk STRTPSTRTPCTE 
 (2)
 
 
where STR = statutory corporate tax rate, and UK and OS refer to profits taxable in 
the UK and outside of the UK respectively. Disaggregating TP into UK and overseas 
taxable profit and rearranging gives:   
 
osuk TPTPTP       (3) 
Substituting (3) in (2) gives:  
 
osukosuk TPSTRSTRSTRTPCTE *)(* 
    (4) 
 
Substituting (4) into (3) and rearranging gives: 
 
uk
osukos
uk STR
TPSTRSTR
STR
CTETP *)( 
    (5)
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The numerator in the second right hand term is the tax effect of TP
os
 being taxed at 
a rate STR
os
 that differs from STR
uk
. We define this as the Statutory Rate Differential 
(STRD): 
osukos TPSTRSTRSTRD *)(        (6) 
A positive value of STRD represents an overseas statutory rate(s) being higher than 
the UK rate. Substituting equation (5) into (1) gives: 
 
uk
osukos
uk STR
TPSTRSTR
STR
CTEPBTBTD *)(      (7) 
 
However, in practise we cannot observe equation (6) because the disclosed 
reconciliation is to the TE, and not CTE, and consequently timing differences are not 
included. Instead, in reconciling TE and notional tax charge the disclosed STRD
disclosed 
comprises: 
)(*)( ososukosdisclosed PDPBTSTRSTRSTRD       (8) 
 
The difference between equation (8) and (5) is that the former excludes TDs.  
Consequently to the extent that a company has net positive (negative) TDs in 
jurisdictions with statutory tax rates which differ from the UK’s statutory rate, the 
estimated TP will be under (over) stated by the grossed up value of such TDs. In 
turn the disaggregated TD is similar affected. The estimated BTD is shown in 
equation (9) below. 
 
uk
ososukos
uk
esttimated STR
PDPBTSTRSTR
STR
CTEPBTBTD )(*)(     (9) 
Next the BTD is disaggregated into Temporary (TDs) and Permanent differences 
(PDs) as follows. We measure TDs as: 
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ukSTR
DTETD         (10) 
where DTE is adjusted for non-current items, as discussed above. A positive signed 
TD represents temporary differences with the net effect of reducing the current year 
taxable income relative to accounting income and vice versa. Finally, permanent 
differences are defined as: 
TDTPPBTPD      (11) 
 
A positive signed PD represents an adjustment that decreases taxable income 
relative to accounting income. PDs capture non-reversing reconciling items that 
arise from differences between accounting income and taxable income measures.  
 
Data analysis 
The data is initially analysed using change of sign to determine the extent to 
which BTDs and their components vary over time. Subsequently, dynamic panel-data 
estimation is employed to assess formally the relation between BTDs and their 
lagged value. To capture heterogeneity in firm specific factors, normally a fixed 
effects model could be estimated. In this setting of a short time period and large 
number of companies i.e. “small T and large N”, the use of a lagged dependent 
variable as an independent variable results in biased estimates of the coefficients of 
the lagged variable (Nickell, 1981). Consequently, in this setting we use the Blundell 
and Bond (1998) generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator.9 To remove 
scale effects present when using accounting data the analysis is conducted on size 
deflated variables, with book value of closing assets (BVA) acting as the deflator 
(Shen and Stark, 2011).10 Descriptive statistics are also reported for variables 
deflated by profit before tax (PBT), which although having a more intuitive 
interpretation in linking BTD with pre-tax accounting income, may reflect  scale 
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effects because of possible association between levels of pre-tax accounting income 
and BTDs.,11 In testing the degree of persistence a one period autoregressive 
process AR(1). An AR(1) process maximises the number of observations used in 
estimation thereby leading to more robust estimations and is comparable to models 
used in time series studies of accounting income and taxable income (Plesko and 
Weber (2009).12 The formal model is in turn estimated for BTD and each of its three 
components, PD, TD and STRD as in (12) below in the context of modelling BTD.   
 
it
it
it
it
it X
PBT
BTD
PBT
BTD    '1    (12) 
 
where 'X  is a vector of year dummies 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010.13 As 
discussed above, there is evidence of an association between companies’ industry 
classification and their tax status, the above model is also estimated on sub 
samples formed by industry group. 
 
5. Results  
Descriptive statistics for annual BTDs and components are reported in table 
3. Taking the sample as a whole, the weighted mean BTD is positive in all years 
except 2009, i.e. accounting income exceeds taxable income in each of these five 
years. The excess is in a narrow range of 2% to 4%. The number of companies with a 
positive BTD is an increasing majority for each of first three years before falling 
back over the next three years: over the six years the number ranges from to 49% to 
70%. The mean un-weighted BTD is positive in the first three years and negative in 
2008, 2009 and 2010.  
A similar pattern exists with PDs. For each of the first three years the 
weighted mean 3% is positive i.e. on average PDs increase taxable income relative to 
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accounting income, before a lower weighted mean in the remaining three years with 
a minimum, negative value, in 2009. The percentage of companies with positive 
PDs follows a similar trend to BTDs though closer to 50%.  
There is less variation in the weighted mean TD which is 1% in five years and 
-1% in the remaining year, 2009. On average the effect of TDs is to increase taxable 
profits relative to accounting profits. The range of the percentage of companies 
with positive TDs is 50% to 65%. While all companies have PDs and TDs a reduced 
number have STRDs. The weighted mean is positive in all six years indicating that 
on average overseas statutory rates are higher than the UK rate. However, at the 
firm level this holds for only a minority of companies ranging, from 34% in 2005 to 
44% in 2008. For the majority, overseas profits are taxed at a lower rate than the UK 
rate. 
To examine the stability of the magnitudes of BTDs and their components, 
the differences between the unweighted means across years were analysed using 
ANOVA. The results are reported in the final column of Table 3 indicate no 
significant differences, suggestive of persistency at the sample level.14 
 
XXX Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here XXX 
 
When examined by industry category, there is some evidence of strong 
industry effect in BTDs, see panel A table 4. The number of companies with positive 
BTDs ranges from 41% in the Technology sector to 94% in Utilities. In contrast, 
several industries lie in what can be considered an “inconclusive” range, with Oil 
and gas with 50% to Industrials with 52%. Similar mixed patterns of persistence in 
certain industries and lack of it in others occurs with PDs and TDs in panels B and 
C.  The STRD component shows the highest level of consistency across industries 
17 
 
with all but two industries, Consumer Goods and Utilities, having a sizeable minority 
of companies with positive STRDs. 
The above analysis examines BTDs and their components on a sample wide 
basis and therefore individual firm variation may be lost in aggregation. To examine 
company level variation, table 5 compares the expected and actual frequency of the 
sign of BTDs and their components. This is a direct test of consistency of effect. 
The first row reports the expected and actual frequency of the number of 
companies whose BTDs are positive in all six years of data, row two shows similar 
data for companies with five occurrences of positive BTDs (and therefore one year 
of negative BTD), and so on. Assuming independence across time the expected 
values are generated using a binomial distribution with the probability of a negative 
(positive) sign = 0.5. At the extreme position of 6 positive (negative) signed BTDs 
i.e. no changes in sign, the actual number, 25 (13) is significantly greater than the 
expected number of 2.1 (2.1) at the 1% level in both cases. In the next case, one 
“change” of sign i.e. five positive or five negative BTDs, the actual number is greater 
than expected in both cases, though the difference is only statistically significant in 
the former case. Overall, 58.7% of companies experience at least five positive (or 
five negative signed BTDs in the six-year period with the expected level is 29.2%. 
The three remaining frequency categories have lower than expected frequencies as 
a corollary to the higher than expected frequencies in the more “extreme” positions. 
 
XXX Insert Table 5 about here XXX 
 
The component PD exhibits a similar level of persistence. Of the 133 
companies, 38.3% (51) have at least five positive signed PDs and 20.3% (27) have at 
least five negative signed PDs in the six-year period compared with an expected 
10.9% for each category. The component TD also shows consistency with 39.5% (49) 
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of companies having at least five positive signed TDs, and 20.2% (25) with at least 
five negative signed TDs in the six-year period. This compares with an expected 
rate of 10.9% for five or more positive or negative signed TDs. The component STRD 
is generally similar to PD in terms of consistency of sign. Of the 78 companies 
which reported STRDs, 37.2% (29) have at least five positive STRDs while 13 (16.7%) 
reported at least five negative STRDs compared with an expected percentage of 
10.9% in each case. Overall, there is strong evidence of persistence; the null 
hypothesis of the frequency following a binomial distribution is rejected for BTD 
and each of its components as indicated by the significant chi-squared goodness of 
fit tests reported at the foot of table 5.  
 
XXX Insert Table 6 about here XXX 
 
Table 6 summarises a series of time series estimations of the relation 
between BTDs and its one -period lag, the results are given in columns 1. In 
columns 2, 3 and 4 similar estimations are reported for PDs, TDs and STRDs 
respectively. In each of the estimations the diagnostic tests are satisfied: the 
Hansen test of instrument over-identification is satisfactory with an insignificant 
test statistic along with insignificant AR (2) errors. For BTD, PD and STRD there is a 
significant, stable, relation over time with the estimated coefficients on the lagged 
terms within the range ±1.00. The lagged variable TD is also positive though 
statistically insignificant. Of the three components, STRDs has the highest level of 
persistence when measured by the size of the coefficients with TDs being the least. 
The coefficients for the three components are statistically significantly different 
from each at the 1% level.  
To assess whether the above sample wide results are stable across individual 
industrial groups, we re-estimate the models on three subsamples of companies. 
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Although there are eight industrial categories represented in the sample, see table 
2, there are insufficient number of observations within some of these categories to 
estimate each individually. Instead, the sample is disaggregated into the two largest 
industry categories Industrials, and Consumer Services with 318 and 180 
observations respectively with the remaining categories collapsed into a third 
group, referred to as Others  with 300 observations.  The results are summarised in 
Table 7.  
 
XXX Insert Table 7 about here XXX 
 
Each of the four estimated models satisfies the required diagnostic tests with 
insignificant Hansen test statistic and insignificant AR(2) errors. The coefficient for 
the lagged BTD variable is statistically significant at the 1% level in all three industry 
groups and ranges from 0.327 to 0.676, see columns 1, 2 and 3.15 With each 
coefficient being statistically significantly different from both zero and each other, 
this suggests the initial finding of persistence is general to the full sample, rather 
than being driven by a sub category of observations, and, that the degree of 
persistence varies by industry group. The source of the persistence varies with PDs 
exhibiting significance in both Consumer Services and Others and TDs in 
Industrials. Only for STRD is there significant persistence for in all three industry 
groups. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions  
This paper reports the results of an initial investigation into the behaviour of 
BTDs using hand-collected tax reconciliation data drawn from a panel of UK quoted 
non-financial companies during the period 2005 – 2010.  
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Overall, the various analyses can be summarised as follows. There is 
evidence of consistency in the sign of BTDs and their components in a limited 
number of industry groups (table 4) though in the majority of groups, there is no 
dominate trend. Within companies, goodness of fits tests are rejected (table 5) 
indicative of consistency of sign. However, this consistency does not apply to all 
companies. For example, only 79 companies (59.4%) had either five or more 
positive or negative BTDs in the sample period (table 5). Further, formal time series 
models indicate the degree of persistence both varies by type of BTD and across 
industry. In the context of interpreting the underlying sources of BTDs, STRD has 
the significantly the highest level of persistence (0.718, table 6) suggesting taxation 
as important motivating factor. With the majority of companies face a lower 
overseas statutory rate compared to the UK rate the ability to maintain the STRD 
effect over time is consistent with an underlying tax motivation. Though the 
presence of a number of companies consistently facing the reverse relative 
magnitude of overseas and UK statutory rates indicates non-tax benefits influence 
location or income recognition decisions.  
In the absence of full disclosures on the nature of PDs it is difficult to 
determine an underlying motivation. However, the observation that on average only 
51.5% of PDs were positive over the six year period (average of percentages in table 
3 panel B) indicates that a significant number of PDs do not represent simple “add 
backs” of non-qualifying accounting deductions. A significant proportion of the 
adjustments are of income recognised for accounting income but which is non-
taxable, this would be consistent with “aggressive” financial reporting (Hanlon & 
Slemrod, 2009).         
The relative low persistence of TDs (0.338, table 3) is unexpected if TDs are 
driven by systematic earnings management over several periods. Instead, the low 
value is consistent with the effect of new originating differences being offset by the 
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inevitable reversal of earlier timing differences, a more “mechanical” process. When 
for example levels of capital expenditure qualifying for capital allowances increase 
over time (net) TDs would persist though any reduction in expenditure could result 
in a reversal of effect as appears to be the case in 2009 (see table  3).         
In using BTDs to assess a company’s taxation behaviour these results imply 
users of tax disclosures should attempt to determine the nature of the BTD and 
observe their properties over a number of periods. A similar approach should be 
adopted in using BTDs as a measure of earnings quality. Further research could 
investigate the source(s) of cross-sectional variation in the level of persistence 
although the extent to which this could be done using currently publically disclosed 
tax related information is an empirical question. 
 
 
 
                                                 
Notes: 
 
1  Prior to 2005 UK companies were able to provide deferred tax on a partial 
provisioning method which limited the ability to examine changes over time 
without access to private information on forecast profits, capital expenditure etc. 
(Holland and Jackson, 2004). 
2   ETRs and BTDs are related in that ETRs are the after tax equivalent of (before tax) 
BTDs. 
3
  Long run measures “avoids much of the mismatch of cash taxes and earnings” 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), as discussed subsequently we focus on the accrued 
tax charge and exclude prior year adjustments to minimise this effect. 
4  The treatment would however effect the composition of the total tax expense. i.e. 
between current and deferred tax charges.  
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5  ETR is defined as the ratio of current tax expense relative to the accounting profit 
before tax. The ETR is the after tax effect of the pre-tax or gross book tax-
difference. 
6 IAS 12 allows uses of domestic rate or the weighted average rate of the 
jurisdictions in which the company operates. In all company year end 
reconciliations included in the sample the domestic (UK) statutory rate was used.  
7  See footnote 5. 
8  The effect of tax credits for expenditure on e.g. research and development 
expenditure are also adjusted as they are required to be disclosed.   
9  Estimated using the xtabond2 command in Stata, see Roodman (2009). 
10  While Shen and Stark (2011) examine deflator properties in the context of 
valuation models such models utilise financial statement based data as in this 
study and therefore it is reasonable to apply their conclusion in this setting.  
11  The results of the BVA and PBT deflated data are qualitatively the same. When 
deflating by PBT, the resulting measure has an obvious interpretation in stating 
the BTD relative to PBT. However, to reduce the effect of any relation between the 
level of PBT and BTD, the BVA deflator is used (Plesko and Weber 2009).    
12  Untabulated results based on an AR(2) process show qualitatively similar results 
to those using the AR(1) specification. 
13 The use of time dummies is recommended by Roodman (2009) to assist in 
meeting the assumption that idiosyncratic disturbances are uncorrelated across 
observations. 
14  In the absence of homogeneous variances across years, the Welch robustness test 
is also reported as appropriate. 
15  With two exceptions the difference in regression coefficients between each pair 
of industry groups is significant at the 1% level for each set of comparison i.e. 
BTD, PD, TD and STRD, for example, the comparison of _BTD_Industrialst-1 with 
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                                                                                                                                                        _BTD_Consumer_Servicest-1 etc. The two exceptions are the insignificant 
difference between _PD_Industrialst-1and _PD_Consumer_Cervicest-1 and the 
insignificant difference between _PD_Industrialst-1and _PD_Otherst-1T-
statistics available from authors upon request. 
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Figure 1: Accounting and taxation processes 
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Table 1: Sample reconciliation 
Details n 
Non-financial public listed companies (listed throughout the period) 2490 
At least one year of annual report is not available (462) 
At least one of the accounting periods is more than 12 months (552) 
Extreme value of effective tax rates (-1>ETR>1)  (57) 
Negative profit before tax (143) 
Unbalance data (478) 
Total sample  798 
 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of sample by industry  
Details Firm-year (n=798) % 
Oil and gas 48 6.01 
Basic materials 78 9.77 
Industrials 318 39.85 
Consumer goods 72 9.02 
Health care 18 2.26 
Consumer services 180 22.56 
Utilities 18 2.26 
Technology 66 8.27 
Total (133 companies * 6 year ends) 798 100 
Note: Based on FT-SE Industry Classifications. 
29 
 
Table 3 BTD: Descriptive statistics by year 
 Year n# Mean S.D. Min Median Max Weighted 
mean 
% >0 Difference in Unweighted means 
Panel A: BTD/BVA 2005 133 0.02 0.06 -0.21 0.01 0.43 0.03 56% (a) 1.037 (5, 792) 
 2006 133 0.03 0.08 -0.10 0.01 0.77 0.04 65% (b) 0.908 (5, 367) 
 2007 133 0.03 0.12 -0.13 0.01 1.18 0.04 70% (c) 0.151 (5, 792) 
 2008 133 0.02 0.08 -0.10 0.01 0.72 0.02 58%  
 2009 133 0.01 0.09 -0.12 0.00 0.97 -0.00 49%  
 2010 133 0.02 0.07 -0.09 0.00 0.50 0.02 54%  
Panel B: PD/ BVA 2005 133 0.01 0.07 -0.20 0.00 0.41 0.03 51% (a) 0.666 (5, 792) 
 2006 133 0.02 0.09 -0.10 0.00 0.72 0.03 54% (b) 0.545 (5, 367) 
 2007 133 0.02 0.13 -0.15 0.00 1.33 0.03 57% (c) 0.183 (5, 792) 
 2008 133 0.02 0.07 -0.10 0.00 0.51 0.01 51%  
 2009 133 0.01 0.11 -0.12 0.00 1.12 -0.00 46%  
 2010 133 0.01 0.08 -0.26 0.00 0.68 0.01 50%  
Panel C: TD/ BVA 2005 133 0.01 0.04 -0.28 0.00 0.19 0.01 59% (a) 0.295 (5, 792) 
 2006 133 0.01 0.04 -0.23 0.01 0.12 0.01 65% (b) 0.355 (5, 368) 
 2007 133 0.00 0.04 -0.16 0.00 0.15 0.01 60% (c) 0.957 (5, 792) 
 2008 133 0.01 0.04 -0.19 0.00 0.21 0.01 59%  
 2009 133 0.00 0.03 -0.15 0.00 0.12 -0.00 50%  
 2010 133 0.00 0.05 -0.19 0.00 0.28 0.01 52%  
Panel D: STRD/ BVA 2005 111 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 34% (a) 0.164 (5, 660) 
 2006 111 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.11 0.00 40% (b) 0.156 (5, 307) 
 2007 111 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00 40% (c) 0.342 (5, 660) 
 2008 111 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.11 -0.00 44%  
 2009 111 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.09 0.00 41%  
 2010 111 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.08 0.00 41%  
(a) ANOVA F test statistic, (b) Welch F test statistic and (c) Levene's test of homogeneity of variance. # Number of companies that 
report the component at least one time during the period. 
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Table 3 PBT: Descriptive statistics by year 
 Year n# Mean S.D. Min Median Max Weighted 
mean 
% >0 Difference in Unweighted 
means 
Panel A: BTD/PBT 2005 133 0.13 0.56 -1.49 0.07 2.21 0.25 56% (a) 2.861** (5, 792) 
 2006 133 0.17 0.56 -2.02 0.11 2.27 0.29 65% (b) 2.086* (5, 366) 
 2007 133 0.12 0.68 -5.05 0.12 2.30 0.27 70% (c) 4.692*** (5, 792) 
 2008 133 0.02 0.72 -4.30 0.07 2.74 0.13 68%  
 2009 133 -0.18 1.33 -8.52 -0.04 4.14 -0.05 45%  
 2010 133 0.06 1.06 -3.07 0.05 7.66 0.15 54%  
Panel B: PD/PBT 2005 133 0.06 0.66 -3.26 0.02 3.15 0.21 51% (a) 0.742 (5, 792) 
 2006 133 0.12 0.76 -2.02 0.03 6.43 0.22 54% (b) 0.776 (5, 365) 
 2007 133 0.17 0.91 -5.63 0.04 4.80 0.23 57% (c) 1.736 (5, 792) 
 2008 133 0.09 0.65 -2.58 0.02 4.03 0.08 51%  
 2009 133 -0.02 1.01 -3.96 -0.03 3.82 -0.04 46%  
 2010 133 -0.15 3.41 -36.55 0.00 10.97 0.10 50%  
Panel C: TD/PBT 2005 133 0.07 0.45 -2.96 0.03 3.13 0.05 59% (a) 1.084 (5, 792) 
 2006 133 0.05 0.69 -6.71 0.07 1.24 0.07 65% (b) 1.597 (5, 361) 
 2007 133 -0.05 0.71 -4.47 0.05 0.98 0.04 60% (c) 2.701** (5, 792) 
 2008 133 -0.08 0.74 -6.46 0.04 1.58 0.04 59%  
 2009 133 -0.16 1.29 -6.86 0.00 6.34 -0.02 50%  
 2010 133 0.22 3.04 -5.32 0.00 33.56 0.05 52%  
Panel D: STRD/PBT 2005 111 0.00 0.08 -0.29 0.00 0.50 0.02 34% (a) 0.446 (5, 660) 
 2006 111 0.01 0.08 -0.14 0.00 0.77 0.01 41% (b) 0.578 (5, 302) 
 2007 111 0.01 0.07 -0.26 0.00 0.50 0.01 40% (c) 0.901 (5, 660) 
 2008 111 -0.00 0.04 -0.17 0.00 0.15 -0.00 44%  
 2009 111 -0.01 0.07 -0.39 -0.00 0.30 0.00 41%  
 2010 111 0.01 0.15 -0.24 -0.00 1.45 0.00 41%  
(a) ANOVA F test statistic, (b) Welch F test statistic and (c) Levene's test of homogeneity of variance. *, **, *** respectively 
indicates significance at 5%, 2.5% and 1% levels (two tailed). Number of companies that report the component at least one time 
during the period. 
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Table 4:  Descriptive statistics by industry group 
 Variable Industry group n# Mean  S.D. Min Median Max Weighted 
mean 
% >0 Difference in means 
Panel A:  BTD Oil and gas 48 0.01 0.09 -0.21 0.00 0.29 -0.03 50% (a) 5.387*** (7, 790) 
  Basic materials 78 0.06 0.13 -0.20 0.03 0.77 0.04 76% (b) 5.446*** (7, 134) 
  Industrials 318 0.00 0.04 -0.13 0.00 0.20 0.01 52% (c) 7.878*** (7, 790) 
  Consumer goods 72 0.02 0.33 -0.03 0.01 0.18 0.02 75%  
  Health care 18 -0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.02 44%  
  Consumer services 180 0.04 0.14 -0.08 0.01 1.18 0.03 62%  
  Utilities 18 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.02 94%  
  Technology 66 0.01 0.06 -0.07 -0.01 0.36 0.00 41%  
Panel B:  PD Oil and gas 48 -0.00 0.09 -0.20 -0.02 0.28 -0.04 40% (a) 3.950*** (7, 790) 
  Basic materials 78 0.05 0.13 -0.07 0.02 0.72 0.03 69% (b) 3.752*** (7, 130) 
  Industrials 318 0.00 0.05 -0.06 -0.00 0.30 0.00 43% (c) 5.739*** (7, 790) 
  Consumer goods 72 0.01 0.20 -0.03 0.01 0.07 0.02 67%  
  Health care 18 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.02 50%  
  Consumer services 180 0.03 0.15 -0.09 0.00 1.34 0.02 52%  
  Utilities 18 0.01 0.04 -0.11 0.01 0.07 0.01 78%  
  Technology 66 0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.01 0.35 0.02 58%  
Panel C:  TD Oil and gas 48 0.02 0.06 -007 -0.00 0.24 0.01 50% (a) 6.078*** (7, 790) 
  Basic materials 78 0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.28 0.00 64% (b) 5.195*** (7, 128) 
  Industrials 318 0.00 0.04 -2.28 0.00 0.24 0.01 61% (c) 3.941*** (7, 790) 
  Consumer goods 72 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.10 0.01 65%  
  Health care 18 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 33%  
  Consumer services 180 0.01 0.40 -0.17 0.00 0.21 0.01 62%  
  Utilities 18 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.12 0.01 78%  
  Technology 66 -0.02 0.05 -0.22 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 23%  
Panel D:  STRD Oil and gas 48 -0.00 0.13 -0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.01 35% (a) 3.265*** (7, 658) 
  Basic materials 78 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.11 0.00 40% (b) 4.201*** (7, 73) 
  Industrials 252 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 34% (c) 7.005*** (7, 658) 
  Consumer goods 72 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 60%  
  Health care 18 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 44%  
  Consumer services 132 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 46%  
  Utilities 6 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 50%  
  Technology 60 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 30%  
(a) ANOVA F test statistic, (b) Welch F test statistic and (c) Levene's test of homogeneity of variance. *, **, *** respectively indicates significance at 5%, 2.5% and 
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1% levels (two tailed).# Number of companies that report the component at least one time during the period. 
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Table 5: Consistency of sign 
 BTD/BVA PD/BVA TD/BVA STRD/BVA 
actual 
(expected) 
N cum % n cum % N cum % N cum % 
6 +ve 25*** 18.8% 25*** 18.8% 23*** 18.5% 14*** 17.9% 
(2.1) (1.6%) (2.1) (1.6%) (2.0) (1.6%) (1.5) (1.6%) 
5 +ve 26** 38.3% 26** 38.3% 26*** 39.5% 15 37.2% 
(12.5) (10.9%) (12.5) (10.9%) (12.2) (10.9%) (9.0) (10.9%) 
4 +ve 24 56.4% 24 56.4% 23 58.1% 14** 55.1% 
(31.2) (34.4%) (31.2) (34.4%) (30.5) (34.4%) (22.5) (34.4%) 
3 +ve 13*** 66.2% 13*** 66.2% 12*** 67.7% 12*** 70.5% 
(41.6) (65.7%) (41.6) (65.7%) (40.6) (65.6%) (30.0) (65.6%) 
2 +ve 18* 79.7% 18* 79.7% 15** 79.8% 10*** 83.3% 
(31.2) (89.1%) (31.2) (89.1%) (30.5) (89.1%) (22.5) (89.1%) 
1 +ve 14 90.2% 14 90.2% 12 89.5% 5 89.7% 
(12.5) (98.5%) (12.5) (98.5%) (12.2) (98.4%) (9.0) (98.4%) 
0 +ve 13*** 100.0% 13*** 100.0% 13*** 100.0% 8*** 100.0% 
(2.1) (100.0%) (2.1) (100.0%) (2.0) (100.0%) (1.5) (100.0%) 
Number of companiesa 133   133   124   78  
Chi-squared goodness of fit 
testb 
273.44 ***  
(6) 
204.26***  
(6) 
141.040*** 
(6) 
 
623.689*** 
(6) 
*, ** and *** are univariate test of difference between actual number and expected number, significant at 5, 2.5 and 1% 
level respectively (two tailed). 
a Number of companies that report the component throughout the six year period. 
b ***  statistically significant at 1% level (null hypothesis – the observed frequency distribution is identical to the 
expected frequency distribution assuming a binomial distribution). 
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Table 6:  Time series regression results 
 
Dependent variable (DV): 1 2 3 4 
 BTD/BVA    PD/BVA TD/BVA STRD/BVA 
Independent variable 
 = DVt-1 
0.604 
(10.01***) 
0.581 
(13.89***) 
0.338 
(1.55) 
0.718 
(15.63***) 
 
Year dummies 
        
     
     
F-statistic 26.27 
(6,133)*** 
39.33 
(6,133)**** 
7.14 
(6,124)*** 
60.59 
(6,78)*** 
Number of observations 665 665 620 390 
Number of groups 133 133 124 78 
Number of instruments 19 19 19 19 
 
Arellano-Bond test (AR1)  
 
-1.59 
 
-1.32** 
 
-1.95 
 
-1.06 
Arellano-Bond test (AR2) 1.08 1.11 1.47 -0.46 
 
Hansen  2 (12)  19.52  17.12  18.29  12.41 
1. Blundell and Bond (1998) DPD two step system GMM estimator. 
2. Bracketed figures represent t –statistics (Windmeijer corrected standard 
errors). 
3. ***, **, and * significant at 5, 2.5 and 1% respectively. 
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Table 7: Time series regression results by Industry category  
Panel A 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Industrials Consumer 
services 
Others Industrials Consumer 
services 
Others 
Dependent variable (DV): BTD/BVA BTD/BVA BTD/BVA PD/BVA PD/BVA PD/BVA 
Independent variable 
 = DVt-1 
0.327 
(3.51***) 
0.676 
(30.52***) 
0.552 
(3.14*** 
0.580 
(1.75) 
0.607 
(27.83***) 
0.543 
(2.96***) 
Year dummies       
F-statistic 4.73 
(6,52***) 
1552.80 
(6,30****) 
16.13 
(6,50***) 
4.95 
(6,53***) 
515.75 
(6,30****) 
11.16 
(6,50***) 
Number of observations 260 150 250 265 150 250 
Number of groups 52 30 50 53 30 50 
Number of instruments 19 19 19 19 19 19 
 
Arellano-Bond test (AR1)  
 
-2.89*** 
 
-1.10 
 
-1.65 
 
-1.80 
 
-1.06 
 
-1.66 
Arellano-Bond test (AR2) -0.41 1.02 0.51 0.83 1.04 0.90 
Hansen  2 (12) 10.98 18.94 16.69 14.30 11.53 18.69 
Panel B  Industrials Consumer 
services 
Others Industrials Consumer 
services 
Others 
Dependent variable (DV): TD/BVA BD/BVA TD/BVA  STRD/BVA STRD/BVA STRD/BVA 
Independent variable 
 = DVt-1 
0.772 
(4.67***) 
-0.012 
(-0.09) 
0.283 
(1.31) 
0.457 
(2.68**) 
0.651 
(44.53***) 
0.785 
(19.63***) 
Year dummies       
F-statistic 13.64 
(6,48***) 
7.48 
(6,28***) 
0.77  
(6, 48) 
3.76 
(6,32***) 
520.63 
(6,12***) 
146.32 
(6,34***) 
Number of observations 240 140 240 160 60 170 
Number of groups 48 28 48 32 12 34 
Number of instruments 19 19 19 19 19 19 
 
Arellano-Bond test (AR1)  
 
-2.85*** 
 
-1.21 
 
-2.64 
 
-2.23 
 
-1.08 
 
-0.18 
Arellano-Bond test (AR2) -0.71 0.80 1.52 0.35 1.02 -1.31 
Hansen  2 (12) 14.88 14.67 20.39 18.30 9.82 73.88 
1. Blundell and Bond (1998) DPD two step system GMM estimator. 
2. Bracketed figures represent t –statistics (Windmeijer corrected standard errors). 
3. *, **, *** and *** significant at 5, 2.5 and 1% respectively. 
 
